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Single Idea 20067
[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
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Full Idea
Intentions are unlike desires. You can simultaneously desire two things that you know are incompatible. But when you form intentions you are embarking on a course of action, and there is a much stronger requirement of consistency.
Gist of Idea
You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent
Source
Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Relationship')
Book Ref
Stout,Rowland: 'Action' [Acumen 2005], p.104
A Reaction
I'm not sure why anyone would identify intentions with desires. I would quite like to visit Japan, but have no current intention of doing so. I assume that the belief-plus-desire theory doesn't deny that an uninteresting intention is also needed.
The
34 ideas
from Rowland Stout
20035
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Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions
[Stout,R]
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20036
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Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act
[Stout,R]
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20039
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The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act
[Stout,R]
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20038
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If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant
[Stout,R]
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20044
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The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification
[Stout,R]
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20043
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Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual
[Stout,R]
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20049
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Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause
[Stout,R]
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20046
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For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it
[Stout,R]
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20047
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Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds
[Stout,R]
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20048
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There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification
[Stout,R]
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20053
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An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you
[Stout,R]
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20052
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If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action
[Stout,R]
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20050
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Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent
[Stout,R]
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20059
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I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events
[Stout,R]
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20058
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Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way
[Stout,R]
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20061
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Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other
[Stout,R]
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20060
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Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations
[Stout,R]
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20055
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A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification
[Stout,R]
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20056
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In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states
[Stout,R]
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20065
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Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action?
[Stout,R]
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20073
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Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions
[Stout,R]
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20068
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Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations
[Stout,R]
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20067
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You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent
[Stout,R]
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20066
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Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions
[Stout,R]
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20069
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A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on
[Stout,R]
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20070
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An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano
[Stout,R]
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20071
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An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group
[Stout,R]
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20078
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The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises
[Stout,R]
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20077
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If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency
[Stout,R]
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20081
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Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle
[Stout,R]
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20083
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Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events)
[Stout,R]
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20079
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Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result?
[Stout,R]
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20080
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If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it?
[Stout,R]
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20084
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Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification
[Stout,R]
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