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Full Idea
The early Davidson championed the approach that we explain the idea of having an intention by providing an account of what it is to act with an intention.
Gist of Idea
We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention
Source
report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Rowland Stout - Action 7 'Conclusion'
Book Ref
Stout,Rowland: 'Action' [Acumen 2005], p.116
A Reaction
This eliminates the distinction between a prior intention, and the intention that maintains a process such as speech. It sounds almost behaviourist.
Related Idea
Idea 20074 We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R]
7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |
23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |