more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 20076
[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
]
Full Idea
We can identify an intentional action ...with an all-out conditional judgement that the action is desirable. ...In the case of pure intending, I now suggest that the intention simply is an all-out judgement.
Gist of Idea
An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable
Source
Donald Davidson (Intending [1978], p.99), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 8 'Davidson's'
Book Ref
Stout,Rowland: 'Action' [Acumen 2005], p.120
A Reaction
'Pure' intending seems to be what Stout calls 'prior' intending, which is clearer. This still strikes me as obviously false. I judge that it is desirable that I make a cup of coffee, but secretly I'm hoping someone else will make it for me.
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[intrinsic nature of a decisive mental state]:
4380
|
Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not
[Burnyeat on Aristotle]
|
20041
|
Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting
[Anscombe]
|
20072
|
We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention
[Davidson, by Stout,R]
|
20076
|
An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable
[Davidson]
|
20034
|
Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs
[Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
|
20033
|
Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans
[Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
|
20169
|
An action may be intended under one description, but not under another
[Kekes]
|
23146
|
Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions
[Driver]
|
20039
|
The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act
[Stout,R]
|
20044
|
The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification
[Stout,R]
|
20047
|
Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds
[Stout,R]
|
20065
|
Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action?
[Stout,R]
|
20067
|
You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent
[Stout,R]
|
20078
|
The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises
[Stout,R]
|
20022
|
To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned
[Wilson/Schpall]
|
20023
|
If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing
[Wilson/Schpall]
|
20025
|
We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed
[Wilson/Schpall]
|