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Single Idea 20078
[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
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Full Idea
One way to incorporate this [normative] feature of intentions would be to treat them like internal promises.
Gist of Idea
The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises
Source
Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 8 'Intention')
Book Ref
Stout,Rowland: 'Action' [Acumen 2005], p.130
A Reaction
Interesting. The concept of a promise is obviously closely linked to an intention. If you tell your companion exactly where you intend your golf ball to land, you can thereby be held accountable, in a manner resembling a promise (but not a promise).
The
17 ideas
with the same theme
[intrinsic nature of a decisive mental state]:
4380
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Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not
[Burnyeat on Aristotle]
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20041
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Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting
[Anscombe]
|
20072
|
We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention
[Davidson, by Stout,R]
|
20076
|
An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable
[Davidson]
|
20034
|
Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs
[Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
|
20033
|
Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans
[Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
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20169
|
An action may be intended under one description, but not under another
[Kekes]
|
23146
|
Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions
[Driver]
|
20039
|
The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act
[Stout,R]
|
20044
|
The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification
[Stout,R]
|
20047
|
Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds
[Stout,R]
|
20065
|
Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action?
[Stout,R]
|
20067
|
You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent
[Stout,R]
|
20078
|
The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises
[Stout,R]
|
20022
|
To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned
[Wilson/Schpall]
|
20023
|
If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing
[Wilson/Schpall]
|
20025
|
We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed
[Wilson/Schpall]
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