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Full Idea
The falseness of a judgement is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgement. To what extent is it life-advancing, life-preserving, species-preserving. Our fundamental tendency is to assert that our falsest judgements are the most indispensable.
Gist of Idea
We shouldn't object to a false judgement, if it enhances and preserves life
Source
Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §004)
Book Ref
Nietzsche,Friedrich: 'Beyond Good and Evil', ed/tr. Hollingdale,R.J. [Penguin 1973], p.17
A Reaction
This is the standard objection to pragmatism, that what is false may still be useful, and that clever blighter Nietzsche embraces the idea!
| 6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
| 20140 | We shouldn't object to a false judgement, if it enhances and preserves life [Nietzsche] |
| 20122 | We have no organ for knowledge or truth; we only 'know' what is useful to the human herd [Nietzsche] |
| 2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
| 3247 | Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel] |
| 3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
| 12802 | We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley] |
| 12803 | Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley] |