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Single Idea 20169

[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions ]

Full Idea

People can usually be described as intending an action under one description, but not under another. ...Consequently the same action may reasonably be said to be both intentional and unintentional.

Gist of Idea

An action may be intended under one description, but not under another

Source

John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 07.2)

Book Ref

Kekes,John: 'The Human Condition' [OUP 2010], p.148

A Reaction

This is the terrorist/freedom fighter problem. The problem seems to arise with long-term intentions, rather than immediate ones. Maybe it is the significance of the intention, rather than the intention itself?

The 17 ideas with the same theme [intrinsic nature of a decisive mental state]:

4380 Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
20041 Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe]
20072 We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20076 An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson]
20034 Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
20033 Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall]
20169 An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes]
23146 Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver]
20039 The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R]
20044 The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R]
20047 Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R]
20065 Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R]
20067 You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R]
20078 The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R]
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]