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Single Idea 20187

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism ]

Full Idea

Just as a utility-calculating machine would be the ideal moral agent according to utilitarianism, a truth-producing machine would be the ideal epistemic agent according to reliabilism,

Gist of Idea

Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine

Source

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], I 1.2)

Book Ref

Zagzebski,Linda: 'Virtues of the Mind' [CUP 1996], p.29


A Reaction

Love this one! For consequentialists a successful robot is morally superior to an average human being. The reliabilist dream is just something that churns out truths. But what is the role of these truths in subsequent life?


The 15 ideas with the same theme [objections to reliabilist justification]:

Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell]
External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour]
A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn]
If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour]
Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M]
'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R]
Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine [Zagzebski]
More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee]
If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee]
Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee]
Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process [Potter]
In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified? [Comesaņa]
How do we decide which exact process is the one that needs to be reliable? [Comesaņa]
Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]