more on this theme     |     more from this thinker


Single Idea 20217

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge ]

Full Idea

Of course we value the truth, but the value we place on knowledge is more than the value of the truth we thereby acquire. …It also involves a valuabe relation between the knower and the truth.

Gist of Idea

Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable

Source

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 1)

Book Ref

Zagzebski,Linda: 'Virtues of the Mind' [CUP 1996], p.260


A Reaction

Hard to assess this. I take truth to be a successful relationship between a mind and a fact. Knowledge needs something extra, to avoid lucky true beliefs. Does a truth acquire greater and greater value as more people come to know it? Doubtful.


The 34 ideas from 'Virtues of the Mind'

Unlike knowledge, wisdom cannot be misused [Zagzebski]
Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine [Zagzebski]
Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding [Zagzebski]
Some beliefs are fairly voluntary, and others are not at all so [Zagzebski]
Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness [Zagzebski]
Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue [Zagzebski]
Virtue theory is hopeless if there is no core of agreed universal virtues [Zagzebski]
Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked [Zagzebski]
The courage of an evil person is still a quality worth having [Zagzebski]
A virtue must always have a corresponding vice [Zagzebski]
Eight marks distingush skills from virtues [Zagzebski, by PG]
Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims [Zagzebski]
Virtues are deep acquired excellences of persons, which successfully attain desire ends [Zagzebski]
Every moral virtue requires a degree of intelligence [Zagzebski]
The feeling accompanying curiosity is neither pleasant nor painful [Zagzebski]
Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples) [Zagzebski]
We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices [Zagzebski]
For the virtue of honesty you must be careful with the truth, and not just speak truly [Zagzebski]
A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them [Zagzebski]
We need phronesis to coordinate our virtues [Zagzebski]
Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts [Zagzebski]
A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person [Zagzebski]
Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment [Zagzebski]
The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action [Zagzebski]
Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable [Zagzebski]
Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths [Zagzebski]
Precision is only one of the virtues of a good definition [Zagzebski]
Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory [Zagzebski]
Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding [Zagzebski]
For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski]
Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski]
We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski]
Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski]
Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state [Zagzebski, by Whitcomb]