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Single Idea 20237
[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
]
Full Idea
The history of moral feeling is completely different from the history of moral concepts. The former are powerful before, the latter especially after an action in view of the compulsion to pronounce upon it.
Gist of Idea
Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions
Source
Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 034)
Book Ref
Nietzsche,Friedrich: 'Dawn (Daybreak) (v 5)', ed/tr. Smith, Brittain [Stanford 2011], p.29
A Reaction
I think he places the feelings in our animal origins, and the concepts in rather unnatural cultures.
The
30 ideas
with the same theme
[morality is just an expression of feelings]:
2360
|
'Good' is just what we desire, and 'Evil' what we hate
[Hobbes]
|
6234
|
If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings
[Shaftesbury]
|
22382
|
We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings
[Hume]
|
21409
|
Moral principles do not involve feelings
[Kant]
|
6196
|
People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous
[Kant]
|
20237
|
Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions
[Nietzsche]
|
20238
|
Treating morality as feelings is just obeying your ancestors
[Nietzsche]
|
21741
|
'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval
[Russell]
|
23689
|
Moral words have an inherited power from expressing attitudes in emotional situations
[Stevenson,CL]
|
6969
|
Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them
[Ayer]
|
6970
|
Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern
[Ayer]
|
23725
|
Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism
[Ayer, by Smith,M]
|
5206
|
To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval
[Ayer]
|
22486
|
The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings
[Foot]
|
22477
|
Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings
[Foot]
|
2706
|
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons
[Hare]
|
24007
|
Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions
[Williams,B]
|
8035
|
In trying to explain the type of approval involved, emotivists are either silent, or viciously circular
[MacIntyre]
|
8037
|
The expression of feeling in a sentence is in its use, not in its meaning
[MacIntyre]
|
8040
|
Emotivism cannot explain the logical terms in moral discourse ('therefore', 'if..then')
[MacIntyre]
|
8042
|
Nowadays most people are emotivists, and it is embodied in our culture
[MacIntyre]
|
23727
|
Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence
[Smith,M]
|
2853
|
Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes
[Brink]
|
2852
|
Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless
[Brink]
|
2849
|
Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference
[Brink]
|
2851
|
Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements
[Brink]
|
2850
|
How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it?
[Brink]
|
2848
|
Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement
[Brink]
|
7333
|
The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval
[Miller,A]
|
4375
|
Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation
[Achtenberg]
|