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Single Idea 20250

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory ]

Full Idea

It has yet to be proven that there is such a thing as forgetting; all we know is that the act of remembering is not within our power.

Gist of Idea

We may be unable to remember, but we may never actually forget

Source

Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 126)

Book Ref

Nietzsche,Friedrich: 'Dawn (Daybreak) (v 5)', ed/tr. Smith, Brittain [Stanford 2011], p.93

A Reaction

There is some evidence for this. We forget innumerable people, but then find that we recognise them if we meet them many years later. Anecdotes report very ancient memories suddenly surfacing.

The 37 ideas with the same theme [memory as source and preserver of knowledge]:

9067 Many memories of the same item form a single experience [Aristotle]
2665 How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero]
18452 Memory is not conserved images, but reproduction of previous thought [Porphyry]
22977 I can distinguish different smells even when I am not experiencing them [Augustine]
22980 Memory contains innumerable principles of maths, as well as past sense experiences [Augustine]
22983 We would avoid remembering sorrow or fear if that triggered the emotions afresh [Augustine]
22982 Why does joy in my mind make me happy, but joy in my memory doesn't? [Augustine]
22981 Mind and memory are the same, as shown in 'bear it in mind' or 'it slipped from mind' [Augustine]
23660 The theory of ideas, popular with philosophers, means past existence has to be proved [Reid]
23644 Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid]
23643 We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid]
20250 We may be unable to remember, but we may never actually forget [Nietzsche]
24115 There is no proof that we forget things - only that we can't recall [Nietzsche]
23197 Memory is essential, and is only possible by means of abbreviation signs [Nietzsche]
23719 Forgetfulness is a strong positive ability, not mental laziness [Nietzsche]
22220 The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet]
21854 Bergson showed that memory is not after the event, but coexists with it [Bergson, by Deleuze]
2792 It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell]
5414 Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell]
21500 We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI]
21501 If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI]
18734 If you remember wrongly, then there must be some other criterion than your remembering [Wittgenstein]
3493 Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle]
3101 Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman]
2788 If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J]
2787 Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J]
2790 I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J]
2791 Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J]
23304 The ancient Memorists said virtually all types of thinking could be done simply by memory [Sorabji]
23303 Stoics say true memory needs reflection and assent, but animals only have perceptual recognition [Sorabji]
2724 I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R]
2725 To remember something is to know it [Audi,R]
7513 Is memory stored in protein sequences, neurons, synapses, or synapse-strengths? [Pinker]
4919 There seems to be no dividing line between a memory and a thought [Carter,R]
6667 There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe]
3759 You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske]
15703 Memories often conform to a theory, rather than being neutral [Gelman]