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Single Idea 20299

[filed under theme 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique ]

Full Idea

How in the end are we going to distinguish claims or the analytic as 'rational insight', 'primitive compulsion', inferential practice or folk belief from merely some deeply held empirical conviction, indeed, from mere dogma.

Gist of Idea

If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical?

Source

Georges Rey (The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction [2013], 4.1)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.11

A Reaction

This is Rey's summary of the persisting Quinean challenge to analytic truths, in the face of a set of replies, summarised by the various phrases here. So do we reject a dogma of empiricism, by asserting dogmatic empiricism?

The 17 ideas with the same theme [rejection of sharp distinction between real and verbal assertion]:

20959 Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject [Schleiermacher]
21763 When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge [Hegel, by Houlgate]
2515 Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege]
19050 Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences [Quine]
8900 In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]
21338 I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage [Quine]
9366 Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
14473 Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
7321 The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
8803 Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
17737 The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
1622 Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
1624 If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
8201 The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine]
20299 If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical? [Rey]
14619 The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]
15016 Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider]