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Single Idea 20308

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism ]

Full Idea

The mind has only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and external bodies, as long as it is perceived from fortuitous encounters with things, ...and not internally, from the agreements, differences and oppositions of a number of things at once.

Gist of Idea

Encounters with things confuse the mind, and internal comparisons bring clarity

Source

Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 29s)

Book Ref

Spinoza,Benedict de: 'Ethics', ed/tr. Curley,Edwin [Penguin 1996], p.52


A Reaction

[compressed] This is a very nice expression of the commitment to coherence as justification, typical of the rationalist view of things. Empiricists are trapped in an excessively atomistic concept of knowledge (one impression or sense datum at a time).


The 18 ideas with the same theme [reasons in favour of the coherentist view]:

A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato]
Encounters with things confuse the mind, and internal comparisons bring clarity [Spinoza]
Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz]
If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid]
We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James]
Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell]
Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI]
We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman]
If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J]
A well written novel cannot possibly match a real belief system for coherence [Bonjour]
The objection that a negated system is equally coherent assume that coherence is consistency [Bonjour]
A coherent system can be justified with initial beliefs lacking all credibility [Bonjour]
The best explanation of coherent observations is they are caused by and correspond to reality [Bonjour]
Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen]
As science investigates more phenomena, the theories it needs decreases [Bird]
Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor]