more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 20375

[filed under theme 23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique ]

Full Idea

A virtue has to be our invention, our most personal defence and necessity: in any other sense it is merely a danger. What does not condition our life harms it: a virtue merely from a feeling of respect for the concept 'virtue', as Kant desires it, is harm

Gist of Idea

Virtues must be highly personal; if not, it is merely respect for a concept

Source

Friedrich Nietzsche (The Anti-Christ [1889], §11)

Book Ref

Nietzsche,Friedrich: 'Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ', ed/tr. Hollingdale,R.J. [Penguin 1972], p.121


A Reaction

Presumably he sees virtue as the cutting edge of stiffling conventional morality. I'm a bit nervous about embracing highly personal virtues, partly because they might isolate me from my community. I ain't no übermensch.


The 20 ideas with the same theme [reasons against virtue theory]:

Aristotle neglects the place of rules in the mature virtuous person [Annas on Aristotle]
Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them [Descartes]
Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas]
When aristocracy or the bourgeoisie dominate, certain values dominate with them [Marx/Engels]
Virtues must be highly personal; if not, it is merely respect for a concept [Nietzsche]
Virtue has been greatly harmed by the boringness of its advocates [Nietzsche]
After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche]
Many virtues are harmful traps, but that is why other people praise them [Nietzsche]
You are mastered by your own virtues, but you must master them, and turn them into tools [Nietzsche]
Virtue is wasteful, as it reduces us all to being one another's nurse [Nietzsche]
Virtue for everyone removes its charm of being exceptional and aristocratic [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche thought our psychology means there can't be universal human virtues [Nietzsche, by Foot]
Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard]
Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions [Foot]
To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett]
Virtue is secondary to a role-figure, defined within a culture [MacIntyre, by Statman]
Virtue theory needs an external standard to judge behaviour and character [Inwagen, by Statman]
Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues [Hursthouse]
Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman]
Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman]