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Full Idea
There are three suggested epistemic conditions on a priori knowledge: the first regards the source of justification, the second regards the defeasibility of justification, and the third appeals to the strength of justification.
Gist of Idea
Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength
Source
Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2)
Book Ref
'Oxford Handbook of Epistemology', ed/tr. Moser, Paul K. [OUP 2002], p.98
A Reaction
[compressed] He says these are all inspired by Kant. The non-epistemic suggested condition involve necessity or analyticity. The source would have to be entirely mental; the defeasibly could not be experiential; the strength would be certainty.
| 20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
| 20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
| 20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
| 20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
| 20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
| 20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |