more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
There is reason to view non-epistemic analyses of a priori knowledge (in terms of necessity or analyticity) with suspicion. The a priori concerns justification. Analysis by necessity or analyticity concerns the proposition rather than the justification.
Gist of Idea
Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification
Source
Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2.1)
Book Ref
'Oxford Handbook of Epistemology', ed/tr. Moser, Paul K. [OUP 2002], p.99
A Reaction
[compressed] The fact that the a priori is entirely a mode of justification, rather than a type of truth, is the modern view, influenced by Kripke. Given that assumption, this is a good objection.
Related Idea
Idea 20471 Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo]
| 20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
| 20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
| 20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
| 20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
| 20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
| 20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |