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Single Idea 20473
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
]
Full Idea
According to Kitcher, if experiential evidence can defeat someone's justification for a belief, then their justification depends on the absence of that experiential evidence.
Gist of Idea
If experiential can defeat a belief, then its justification depends on the defeater's absence
Source
report of Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], p.89) by Albert Casullo - A Priori Knowledge 2.3
Book Ref
'Oxford Handbook of Epistemology', ed/tr. Moser, Paul K. [OUP 2002], p.105
A Reaction
Sounds implausible. There are trillions of possible defeaters for most beliefs, but to say they literally depend on trillions of absences seems a very odd way of seeing the situation
The
32 ideas
from 'The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge'
6298
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Kitcher says maths is an idealisation of the world, and our operations in dealing with it
[Kitcher, by Resnik]
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12387
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Mathematical knowledge arises from basic perception
[Kitcher]
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12412
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My constructivism is mathematics as an idealization of collecting and ordering objects
[Kitcher]
|
12413
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A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge
[Kitcher]
|
12389
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Knowledge is a priori if the experience giving you the concepts thus gives you the knowledge
[Kitcher]
|
12390
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A priori knowledge comes from available a priori warrants that produce truth
[Kitcher]
|
12416
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We have some self-knowledge a priori, such as knowledge of our own existence
[Kitcher]
|
12418
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In long mathematical proofs we can't remember the original a priori basis
[Kitcher]
|
12392
|
Mathematical a priorism is conceptualist, constructivist or realist
[Kitcher]
|
12420
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If mathematics comes through intuition, that is either inexplicable, or too subjective
[Kitcher]
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12393
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Intuition is no basis for securing a priori knowledge, because it is fallible
[Kitcher]
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18061
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Mathematical intuition is not the type platonism needs
[Kitcher]
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18063
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Conceptualists say we know mathematics a priori by possessing mathematical concepts
[Kitcher]
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18064
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If meaning makes mathematics true, you still need to say what the meanings refer to
[Kitcher]
|
12423
|
Analyticity avoids abstract entities, but can there be truth without reference?
[Kitcher]
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18065
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We derive limited mathematics from ordinary things, and erect powerful theories on their basis
[Kitcher]
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18066
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The old view is that mathematics is useful in the world because it describes the world
[Kitcher]
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18067
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Abstract objects were a bad way of explaining the structure in mathematics
[Kitcher]
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18069
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Arithmetic is an idealizing theory
[Kitcher]
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18068
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Arithmetic is made true by the world, but is also made true by our constructions
[Kitcher]
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18070
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We develop a language for correlations, and use it to perform higher level operations
[Kitcher]
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18071
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A one-operation is the segregation of a single object
[Kitcher]
|
12395
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Real numbers stand to measurement as natural numbers stand to counting
[Kitcher]
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18074
|
Intuitionists rely on assertability instead of truth, but assertability relies on truth
[Kitcher]
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18072
|
Constructivism is ontological (that it is the work of an agent) and epistemological (knowable a priori)
[Kitcher]
|
18075
|
Idealisation trades off accuracy for simplicity, in varying degrees
[Kitcher]
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12425
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Complex numbers were only accepted when a geometrical model for them was found
[Kitcher]
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18077
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The defenders of complex numbers had to show that they could be expressed in physical terms
[Kitcher]
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18078
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The interest or beauty of mathematics is when it uses current knowledge to advance undestanding
[Kitcher]
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12426
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The 'beauty' or 'interest' of mathematics is just explanatory power
[Kitcher]
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18083
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With infinitesimals, you divide by the time, then set the time to zero
[Kitcher]
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20473
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If experiential can defeat a belief, then its justification depends on the defeater's absence
[Kitcher, by Casullo]
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