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Full Idea
A justified belief that a proposition is not true is an 'overriding' defeater, ...and the belief that a justification is inadequate or defective is an 'undermining' defeater.
Gist of Idea
'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in
Source
Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], n 40)
Book Ref
'Oxford Handbook of Epistemology', ed/tr. Moser, Paul K. [OUP 2002], p.140
A Reaction
Sounds more like a sliding scale than a binary option. Quite useful, though.
| 20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
| 20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
| 20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
| 20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
| 20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
| 20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |
| 3913 | Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification [Casullo] |