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Full Idea
Some people claim that modal sentences do not express truths or falsehoods.
Gist of Idea
Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false
Source
Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2)
Book Ref
'Oxford Handbook of Epistemology', ed/tr. Moser, Paul K. [OUP 2002], p.112
A Reaction
I can only imagine this coming from a narrow hardline empiricist. It seems to me obvious that we make true or false statements about what is possible or impossible.
| 20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
| 20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
| 20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
| 20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
| 20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
| 20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |
| 3913 | Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification [Casullo] |