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Single Idea 20476

[filed under theme 10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary ]

Full Idea

If one can only know a priori that a proposition is necessary, then one can know only a priori that a proposition is contingent. The evidence relevant to determining the latter is the same as that relevant to determining the former.

Gist of Idea

If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved

Source

Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2)

Book Ref

'Oxford Handbook of Epistemology', ed/tr. Moser, Paul K. [OUP 2002], p.113


A Reaction

This seems a telling point, but I suppose it is obvious. If you see that the cat is on the mat, nothing in the situation tells you whether this is contingent or necessary. We assume it is contingent, but that may be an a priori assumption.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [knowing what must be, just through thought]:

We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes]
Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent [Locke]
Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz]
Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz]
Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz]
Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Kant, by Morris,M]
Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Kant, by Schroeter]
For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Kant, by Maudlin]
Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience [Kant]
The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein]
A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam]
Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker]
Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady]
A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke]
Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden]
Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett]
Many necessities are inexpressible, and unknowable a priori [Kitcher]
If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo]
Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers]
Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson]
Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative [O'Grady]