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Single Idea 20621
[filed under theme 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
]
Full Idea
Lying can involve (1) speaking false words, (2) the intention to speak false words, (3) the intention of bringing about deception, and (4) the ultimate goal of one's deception.
Gist of Idea
Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal?
Source
report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Q110) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 10 'Lying'
Book Ref
Tuckness,A / Wolf,C: 'This is Political Philosophy' [Wiley Blackwell 2017], p.239
A Reaction
It's a start, but much more is needed to clarify lying. Irony is an obvious problem with (1).
The
31 ideas
with the same theme
[whether truth exists, and what it is in general]:
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10913
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Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations
[Aristotle]
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10914
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Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking
[Aristotle]
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10916
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Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together
[Aristotle]
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5728
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The concept of truth was originated by the senses
[Lucretius]
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2673
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There cannot be more than one truth
[Cicero]
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4748
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Anselm of Canterbury identified truth with God
[Anselm, by Engel]
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23176
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Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not
[Aquinas]
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20621
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Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal?
[Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf]
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21864
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Truth is its own standard
[Spinoza]
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19333
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A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject
[Leibniz]
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12910
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The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition
[Leibniz]
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8098
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Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has
[Joubert]
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5420
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Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities
[Russell]
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21953
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For Heidegger there is 'ontic' truth or 'uncoveredness', as in "he is a true friend"
[Heidegger, by Wrathall]
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23884
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Truth is a value of thought
[Weil]
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15471
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Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker')
[Martin,CB]
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6276
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'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green
[Putnam]
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4714
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Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism
[Putnam, by O'Grady]
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10837
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It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements
[Dummett]
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6396
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A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief
[Davidson]
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8820
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Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it
[Pollock]
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6334
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The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth?
[Horwich]
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3883
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A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition
[Scruton]
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4703
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The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality'
[O'Grady]
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4701
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To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong'
[O'Grady]
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13252
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Some truths have true negations
[Beall/Restall]
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15324
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Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles
[Horsten]
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15323
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Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension
[Horsten]
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16330
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Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth
[Halbach]
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16339
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Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion
[Halbach]
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18819
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The idea that there are unrecognised truths is basic to our concept of truth
[Rumfitt]
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