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Single Idea 20793

[filed under theme 3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique ]

Full Idea

One cannot say that the soul grasps the externally existing objects by means of the states of the senses on the basis of the similarity of these states to the externally existing objects. For on what basis will it know the similarity?

Gist of Idea

How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object?

Source

comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Sextus Empiricus - Outlines of Pyrrhonism 2.74

Book Ref

'The Stoics Reader', ed/tr. Inwood,B/Gerson,L.P. [Hackett 2008], p.26

A Reaction

This exactly the main modern reason for rejecting the correspondence theory of truth. You are welcome to affirm a robust view of truth, but supporting it by claiming a correspondence or resemblance is dubious.

Related Idea

Idea 20780 Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]

The 28 ideas with the same theme [criticism of the correspondence theory of truth]:

20793 How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus]
22309 An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley]
19465 There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege]
18983 In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object [James]
16296 Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach]
13984 Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle]
10836 Correspondence theorists shouldn't think that a country has just one accurate map [Austin,JL]
6277 Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam]
4716 The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [Putnam, by O'Grady]
23298 Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson]
18902 Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson]
19148 There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson]
19166 The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson]
19167 Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson]
2572 Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack]
10908 Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
2768 The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J]
6332 The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
3593 The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M]
6084 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn]
6085 The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn]
2959 If something is described in two different ways, is that two facts, or one fact presented in two ways? [Lockwood]
8319 One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe]
9594 Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
4744 We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel]
14391 If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
14418 Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
15337 The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten]