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Single Idea 20799

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First ]

Full Idea

He thought that a grasp made by the senses was true and reliable, …because it left out nothing about the object that could be grasped, and because nature had provided this grasp as a standard of knowledge, and a basis for understanding nature itself.

Gist of Idea

A grasp by the senses is true, because it leaves nothing out, and so nature endorses it

Source

report of Zeno (Citium) (fragments/reports [c.294 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - Academica I.42

Book Ref

'The Stoics Reader', ed/tr. Inwood,B/Gerson,L.P. [Hackett 2008], p.40


A Reaction

Sounds like Williamson's 'knowledge first' claim - that the basic epistemic state is knowledge, which we have when everything is working normally. I like Zeno's idea that a 'grasp' leaves nothing out about the object. Compare nature with Descartes' God.


The 11 ideas with the same theme [knowledge is a basic concept, not to be analysed]:

A grasp by the senses is true, because it leaves nothing out, and so nature endorses it [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
We can't use our own self to criticise our own capacity for knowledge! [Nietzsche]
Knowledge is beyond question, as an unavoidable component of thinking [Weil]
Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology [Williamson, by DeRose]
Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson]
We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson]
Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson]
A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson]
Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson]
Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson]
Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]