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Single Idea 2081

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism ]

Full Idea

Maybe the primary elements of which things are composed are not susceptible to rational accounts. Each of them taken by itself can only be named, but nothing further can be said about it.

Gist of Idea

Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account

Source

Plato (Theaetetus [c.368 BCE], 201e)

Book Ref

Plato: 'Theaetetus', ed/tr. Waterfield,Robin [Penguin 1987], p.116


A Reaction

This still seems to be more or less the central issue in philosophy - which things should be treated as 'primitive', and which other things are analysed and explained using the primitive tools?


The 16 ideas with the same theme [claim that knowledge foundations are possible]:

Maybe primary elements can be named, but not receive a rational account [Plato]
The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes]
I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes]
To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes]
Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes]
Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz]
If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI]
Foundations need not precede other beliefs [Wittgenstein]
The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying [Chisholm]
Modern foundationalists say basic beliefs are fallible, and coherence is relevant [Cleve]
Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour]
Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J]
Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J]
Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske]
Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]