more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 20834
[filed under theme 16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
]
Full Idea
Chrysippus gives vice blatant freedom to say not only that it is necessary and according to fate, but even that it occurs according to god's reason and the best nature.
Gist of Idea
Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural
Source
comment on Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1050c
Book Ref
'The Stoics Reader', ed/tr. Inwood,B/Gerson,L.P. [Hackett 2008], p.104
A Reaction
This is Plutarch's criticism of stoic determinism or fatalism. Zeno replied that the punishment for vice may also be fated. It seems that Chysippus did believe that punishments were too harsh, given that vices are fated [p.109].
Related Ideas
Idea 20833
A swerve in the atoms would be unnatural, like scales settling differently for no reason [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
Idea 1770
When a slave said 'It was fated that I should steal', Zeno replied 'Yes, and that you should be beaten' [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
Idea 20836
The Lazy Argument responds to fate with 'why bother?', but the bothering is also fated [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
The
22 ideas
with the same theme
[defences of the existence of wills which are free]:
|
22504
|
Only a human being can be a starting point for an action
[Aristotle]
|
|
14516
|
There is no necessity to live with necessity
[Epicurus]
|
|
20834
|
Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural
[Plutarch on Chrysippus]
|
|
23338
|
You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice
[Epictetus]
|
|
1856
|
Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable
[Aquinas]
|
|
1861
|
The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it
[Aquinas]
|
|
1862
|
However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit
[Aquinas]
|
|
1853
|
Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will
[Aquinas]
|
|
1849
|
Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them
[Aquinas]
|
|
2282
|
My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could
[Descartes]
|
|
4310
|
We have inner awareness of our freedom
[Descartes]
|
|
23668
|
Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will
[Reid]
|
|
23680
|
We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects
[Reid]
|
|
9756
|
We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires
[Kant, by Korsgaard]
|
|
5597
|
If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing
[Kant]
|
|
3740
|
We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled
[Kant]
|
|
21965
|
Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will
[Fichte]
|
|
20322
|
I am aware that freedom is possible, and the freedom is not in theory, but in seeking freedom
[Jaspers]
|
|
3444
|
If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person
[Chisholm]
|
|
3808
|
Rational decision making presupposes free will
[Searle]
|
|
3818
|
We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective
[Searle]
|
|
3817
|
Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action
[Searle]
|