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Single Idea 20850

[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will ]

Full Idea

Chrysippus says (in his On Passions) that the passions are judgements; for greed is a supposition that money is honorable, and similarly for drunkennes and wantonness and others.

Gist of Idea

Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust

Source

report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.111

Book Ref

'The Stoics Reader', ed/tr. Inwood,B/Gerson,L.P. [Hackett 2008], p.119

A Reaction

This is an endorsement of Socrates's intellectualist reading of weakness of will, as against Aristotle's assigning it to overpowering passions.

Related Idea

Idea 5963 Some say emotion is a sort of reason, and others say virtue concerns emotion [Plutarch]

The 30 ideas with the same theme [failing to perform the action which is judged best]:

22511 Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus]
199 The common belief is that people can know the best without acting on it [Socrates]
195 No one willingly commits an evil or base act [Socrates]
1653 Socrates did not accept the tripartite soul (which permits akrasia) [Vlastos on Socrates]
5843 People do what they think they should do, and only ever do what they think they should do [Socrates, by Xenophon]
5253 Socrates was shocked by the idea of akrasia, but observation shows that it happens [Aristotle on Socrates]
24060 Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle]
4383 Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions [Burnyeat on Aristotle]
68 The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire [Aristotle]
4318 Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action. [Aristotle, by Cottingham]
4372 Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
5254 Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge [Aristotle]
5255 A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular [Aristotle]
23317 Aristotle sees akrasia as acting against what is chosen, not against reason [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
23318 Akrasia is explained by past mental failures, not by a specific choice [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
5257 Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance [Aristotle]
23918 Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle]
22574 A community can lack self-control [Aristotle]
20850 Passions are judgements; greed thinks money is honorable, and likewise drinking and lust [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
19365 Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Leibniz, by Perkins]
22098 Socrates neglects the gap between knowing what is good and doing good [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
24117 We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control [Nietzsche]
7209 There is no will; weakness of will is splitting of impulses, strong will is coordination under one impulse [Nietzsche]
23878 Weakness of will is the inadequacy of the original impetus to carry through the action [Weil]
6385 The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson]
4317 We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham]
23996 Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions [Blackburn]
4355 There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends [Hursthouse]
23995 Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie]
20077 If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R]