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Single Idea 20894

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation ]

Full Idea

It is necessary to recognise that man by virtue of this criterion is separated from reality.

Gist of Idea

Man is separated from reality

Source

Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B006), quoted by Sextus Empiricus - Against the Logicians (two books) 7.137

Book Ref

Democritus: 'Early Greek Phil VII: Democritus', ed/tr. Laks,A/Most,G [Harvard Loeb 2016], p.77


A Reaction

I don't know what 'this criterion' is, but it strikes me as quite a good slogan for fans (like myself) of the representative theory of perception. Critics say it is the big objection to the representative theory, but I say 'get over it'.


The 23 ideas with the same theme [theory that mind represents in order to perceive]:

Man is separated from reality [Democritus]
In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle]
Minds take in a likeness of things, which activates an awaiting potential [Aquinas]
Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck]
We can only know the exterior world via our ideas [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause [Leibniz]
Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley]
Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley]
It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects [Hume]
I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant]
Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H]
Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman]
Representation must be propositional if it can give reasons and be epistemological [McDowell, by Burge]
To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R]
How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R]
We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn]
The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton]
Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H]
One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe]
Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe]
Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe]
The representation may not be a likeness [Velarde-Mayol]