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Single Idea 20971

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind ]

Full Idea

Weak reduction of mind requires only that mental causes be identified with physical causes. A strong reduction requires also that the laws by which such causes operate follow by composition from non-special laws.

Clarification

The 'non-special' laws are the laws of physics

Gist of Idea

Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws

Source

David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], App 3 n8)

Book Ref

Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.243


A Reaction

I'm cautious about laws, but I still vote for strong reduction. No new principles are needed to make a mind from a brain.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [all mental events can be explained physically]:

You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius]
We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell]
Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle]
Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle]
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim]
Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry]
I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett]
Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau]
Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau]
Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan]
'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H]
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette]
Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil]
Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R]
Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R]
We imagine small and large objects scaled to the same size, suggesting a fixed capacity for imagination [Lavers]
Studying biology presumes the laws of chemistry, and it could never contradict them [Friend]