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Single Idea 2117
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
]
Full Idea
There is a connection among our appearances that provides us the means to predict future appearances with success, and this connection must have a constant cause.
Gist of Idea
The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause
Source
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Foucher [1675])
Book Ref
Leibniz,Gottfried: 'Philosophical Essays', ed/tr. Arlew,R /Garber,D [Hackett 1989], p.4
The
31 ideas
with the same theme
[causation as necessitated by nature]:
14543
|
When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows
[Aristotle]
|
1859
|
Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process
[Aquinas]
|
17235
|
A cause is the complete sum of the features which necessitate the effect
[Hobbes]
|
4815
|
From a definite cause an effect necessarily follows
[Spinoza]
|
12726
|
In a true cause we see a necessary connection
[Malebranche]
|
2594
|
A true cause must involve a necessary connection between cause and effect
[Malebranche]
|
12702
|
Causes can be inferred from perfect knowledge of their effects
[Leibniz]
|
2117
|
The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause
[Leibniz]
|
15249
|
Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity
[Harré/Madden on Hume]
|
8339
|
Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity
[Hume, by Strawson,G]
|
2218
|
In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities
[Hume]
|
20705
|
That events could be uncaused is absurd; I only say intuition and demonstration don't show this
[Hume]
|
19274
|
Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events
[Kripke on Hume]
|
23667
|
Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation
[Reid]
|
5523
|
Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association
[Kant]
|
14545
|
A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon
[Mill]
|
15251
|
The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity
[Ayer]
|
4798
|
In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation
[Armstrong, by Psillos]
|
5445
|
Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents
[Ellis]
|
5463
|
Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances
[Ellis]
|
5491
|
A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved
[Ellis]
|
3290
|
Given the nature of heat and of water, it is literally impossible for water not to boil at the right heat
[Nagel]
|
4306
|
For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes
[Cottingham]
|
8444
|
Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall?
[Sosa]
|
8445
|
The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator
[Sosa]
|
4212
|
Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity
[Lowe]
|
9443
|
It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world
[Mumford]
|
14539
|
Nature can be interfered with, so a cause never necessitates its effects
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
14550
|
We assert causes without asserting that they necessitate their effects
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
14546
|
Necessary causation should survive antecedent strengthening, but no cause can always survive that
[Mumford/Anjum]
|
22624
|
A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes
[Ingthorsson]
|