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Single Idea 21223

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic ]

Full Idea

The phenomenological logic grounds logical notions in subjective acts of experience.

Gist of Idea

Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience

Source

report of Edmund Husserl (Formal and Transcendental Logic [1929], p.183) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 4.5.1

Book Ref

Velarde-Mayol,Victor: 'On Husserl' [Wadsworth 2000], p.68


A Reaction

I'll approach this with great caution, but this is a line of thought that appeals to me. The core assumptions of logic do not arise ex nihilo.

Related Idea

Idea 21222 Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]


The 44 ideas from Edmund Husserl

Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet]
Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet]
Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet]
Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya]
We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet]
The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl]
The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl]
The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl]
Only facts follow from facts [Husserl]
Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl]
Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl]
Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl]
Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl]
Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl]
'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl]
After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl]
Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl]
As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl]
The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl]
Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl]
Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl]
We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl]
Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl]
Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl]
Phenomenology is the science of essences - necessary universal structures for art, representation etc. [Husserl, by Polt]
Bracketing subtracts entailments about external reality from beliefs [Husserl, by Putnam]
Phenomenology aims to describe experience directly, rather than by its origins or causes [Husserl, by Mautner]
Husserl says we have intellectual intuitions (of categories), as well as of the senses [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence [Husserl, by Heck]
We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett on Husserl]
Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett on Husserl]
0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Husserl, by Dummett]
Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Husserl, by Frege]
Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc. [Husserl]
If phenomenology is deprived of the synthetic a priori, it is reduced to literature [Benardete,JA on Husserl]