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Single Idea 21259

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition ]

Full Idea

There are three elements in any given thing: the first is what the object actually is, the second is the definition of this, and the third is the name.

Gist of Idea

To grasp a thing we need its name, its definition, and what it really is

Source

Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 895d)

Book Ref

Plato: 'Complete Works', ed/tr. Cooper,John M. [Hackett 1997], p.1552

A Reaction

I take the importance of this to be its distinction between what it is, and the definition of what it is. Aristotle maintains this distinction, but some modern Aristotelians seem to get the confused. Plato worried a lot more about names than we do.

The 21 ideas with the same theme [essence just is the successful definition of a thing]:

21259 To grasp a thing we need its name, its definition, and what it really is [Plato]
10963 A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
11292 Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition [Aristotle]
11287 Essence is what is stated in the definition [Aristotle, by Politis]
12091 If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Aristotle, by Witt]
12146 Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle]
11200 The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas]
17865 Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog]
12981 Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz]
23647 Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid]
12067 An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt]
14260 An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K]
11179 If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K]
16551 Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe]
17309 For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
17315 We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]
17866 Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog]
17868 Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog]
17871 Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog]
17872 Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog]
17953 Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]