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Single Idea 21289
[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
]
Full Idea
In that proposition 'an object is the same with itself', if the idea expressed by the word 'object' were no way distinguished from that meant by 'itself', we should really mean nothing. ...One single object conveys the idea of unity, not that of identity.
Gist of Idea
'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity
Source
David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.2)
Book Ref
Hume,David: 'A Treatise of Human Nature', ed/tr. Selby-Bigge/Nidditch [OUP 1978], p.200
A Reaction
As far as I can see it is mathematicians who like self-identity, to justify x=x, which they need. To say 'this vase is identical with itself' is an empty locution. It expresses either unity or stability over time. See Idea 21292.
Related Idea
Idea 21292
Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time [Hume]
The
23 ideas
with the same theme
[relation of identity holding between a thing and itself]:
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3315
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Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic
[Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
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16134
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We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object
[Aristotle]
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17847
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You are one with yourself in form and matter
[Aristotle]
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12504
|
Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity
[Locke]
|
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3144
|
Everything is what it is, and not another thing
[Butler]
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21289
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'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity
[Hume]
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21292
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Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time
[Hume]
|
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3318
|
Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x'
[Frege, by Benardete,JA]
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6057
|
Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept
[Wittgenstein]
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10193
|
The 'property' of self-identity is uselessly tautological
[Black]
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15806
|
The property of being identical with me is an individual concept
[Chisholm]
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10728
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A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori
[Armstrong, by Oliver]
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17680
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The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property
[Armstrong]
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17044
|
A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation
[Kripke]
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14657
|
Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it
[Plantinga]
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13847
|
If non-existent things are self-identical, they are just one thing - so call it the 'null object'
[Bostock]
|
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15968
|
Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing
[Lewis]
|
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6054
|
Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical
[McGinn]
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6066
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Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects
[McGinn]
|
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3314
|
Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself?
[Benardete,JA]
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3323
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Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent
[Benardete,JA]
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15073
|
Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself
[Fine,K]
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15604
|
If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well?
[Fine,K]
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