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Single Idea 21290

[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity ]

Full Idea

A mutiplicity of objects can never convey the idea of identity. The mind always pronounces the one not to be the other.

Gist of Idea

Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different

Source

David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.2)

Book Ref

Hume,David: 'A Treatise of Human Nature', ed/tr. Selby-Bigge/Nidditch [OUP 1978], p.200

A Reaction

However, if we are talking on the phone about two objects we are viewing, such as two buildings, our descriptions might lead us to conclude that our objects are identical. Thus experience might imply identity.

The 33 ideas with the same theme [how we should understand the idea of identity]:

11380 Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing [Aristotle]
22143 Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter]
22144 Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter]
22146 Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter]
22145 Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter]
22147 Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter]
22148 Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter]
19394 Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality [Leibniz]
1207 Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity [Hume]
21290 Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different [Hume]
11874 Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid]
21320 Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid]
1367 Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid]
16022 The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege [Frege, by Noonan]
11100 Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals [Frege, by Quine]
4893 Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry]
6056 Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein]
17595 To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine]
18965 We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine]
15475 The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB]
15486 Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB]
18389 When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong]
16981 With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
17509 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
4885 Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry]
11843 Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins]
11864 Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins]
17588 We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen]
6058 Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn]
11888 Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
15603 I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K]
10522 The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale]
8970 Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne]