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Single Idea 21297

[filed under theme 16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations ]

Full Idea

[People] are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a continual flux and movement.

Gist of Idea

A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions

Source

David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6)

Book Ref

Hume,David: 'A Treatise of Human Nature', ed/tr. Selby-Bigge/Nidditch [OUP 1978], p.252


A Reaction

Nowadays we must say that this misses the huge non-conscious aspect of what a person is. He seems to see all mental events as equal. Isn't the experience of deciding to focus on this sentence more 'central' than awareness of your feet?


The 13 ideas with the same theme [Self is a unity formed by associating mental events]:

Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume]
A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume]
The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume]
Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume]
A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume]
Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume]
Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer]
Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer]
If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer]
The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle]
Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin]
Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own? [Carruthers]
Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another? [Carruthers]