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Single Idea 21306

[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity ]

Full Idea

As to causation, the true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of different perceptions, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence and modify each other.

Gist of Idea

Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other

Source

David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.6)

Book Ref

Hume,David: 'A Treatise of Human Nature', ed/tr. Selby-Bigge/Nidditch [OUP 1978], p.261


A Reaction

He suggests that the associations of memory and causation might be sufficient to produce identity of the mind, and he gives the priority to memory. Eventually the good empiricist despairs because you cannot experience the links.

Related Idea

Idea 21305 Memory not only reveals identity, but creates it, by producing resemblances [Hume]


The 22 ideas with the same theme [Self as the continuity of our conscious existence]:

For Socrates our soul, though hard to define, is our self [Vlastos on Socrates]
A person is the whole of their soul [Plotinus]
For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Locke, by Martin/Barresi]
If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke]
Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable [Locke]
If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke]
If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) [Locke]
On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke]
Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Locke, by Noonan]
We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz]
Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other [Hume]
Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume]
A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell]
The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit]
If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit]
Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit]
We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan]
It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K]
Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi]
Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi]
In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C]