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Single Idea 21309
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
]
Full Idea
No proposition can be intelligible or consistent with regard to objects, which is not so with regard to perceptions.
Gist of Idea
A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so
Source
David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], Appendix)
Book Ref
Hume,David: 'A Treatise of Human Nature', ed/tr. Selby-Bigge/Nidditch [OUP 1978], p.634
A Reaction
An interesting variant on expressions of the empiricist principle. Presumably one can say intelligible things about Escher drawings.
The
38 ideas
with the same theme
[knowledge is essentially derived from experience]:
1820
|
The criteria of truth are senses, preconceptions and passions
[Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
|
20805
|
All our concepts come from experience, directly, or by expansion, reduction or compounding
[Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
|
12121
|
We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea
[Bacon]
|
3648
|
Empiricists are collecting ants; rationalists are spinning spiders; and bees do both
[Bacon]
|
16688
|
Evidence is conception, which is imagination, which proceeds from the senses
[Hobbes]
|
7405
|
Experience can't prove universal truths
[Hobbes]
|
7724
|
All the ideas written on the white paper of the mind can only come from one place - experience
[Locke]
|
19431
|
There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander
[Leibniz]
|
3953
|
Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter
[Berkeley]
|
6720
|
Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations
[Berkeley]
|
23631
|
Hume is loose when he says perceptions of different strength are different species
[Reid on Hume]
|
2182
|
Impressions are our livelier perceptions, Ideas the less lively ones
[Hume]
|
2184
|
All ideas are copies of impressions
[Hume]
|
2190
|
All objects of enquiry are Relations of Ideas, or Matters of Fact
[Hume]
|
2192
|
All reasoning about facts is causal; nothing else goes beyond memory and senses
[Hume]
|
2246
|
If books don't relate ideas or explain facts, commit them to the flames
[Hume]
|
21309
|
A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so
[Hume]
|
15619
|
Empiricism made particular knowledge possible, and blocked wild claims
[Hegel]
|
15620
|
Empiricism contains the important idea that we should see knowledge for ourselves, and be part of it
[Hegel]
|
14789
|
Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience
[Peirce]
|
16476
|
For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true
[Russell]
|
7290
|
If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa
[Russell, by Thompson]
|
5357
|
It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge
[Russell]
|
5382
|
We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals
[Russell, by PG]
|
5389
|
Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience
[Russell]
|
13932
|
Empiricists tend to reject abstract entities, and to feel sympathy with nominalism
[Carnap]
|
4729
|
Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic
[O'Grady on Ayer]
|
5180
|
All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses
[Ayer]
|
5169
|
My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage
[Ayer]
|
19046
|
Empiricism improvements: words for ideas, then sentences, then systems, then no analytic, then naturalism
[Quine]
|
19049
|
In scientific theories sentences are too brief to be independent vehicles of empirical meaning
[Quine]
|
1620
|
Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts
[Quine]
|
1629
|
Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple
[Quine]
|
8450
|
Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events
[Quine, by Orenstein]
|
8252
|
Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons
[Davidson, by McDowell]
|
8253
|
Sense impressions already have conceptual content
[McDowell]
|
2961
|
Empiricism is a theory of meaning as well as of knowledge
[Lockwood]
|
3172
|
Empiricism says experience is both origin and justification of all knowledge
[Rey]
|