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Single Idea 21311

[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity ]

Full Idea

Is the self the same with substance? If it be, how can that question have place concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of substance? If they be distinct, what is the difference between them?

Gist of Idea

Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes?

Source

David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix [1740], Appendix)

Book Ref

Hume,David: 'A Treatise of Human Nature', ed/tr. Selby-Bigge/Nidditch [OUP 1978], p.635


A Reaction

Locke seems to think there is a characterless substance which supports momories, and the latter constitute the self. So if my substance acquires Nestor's memories, I become Nestor. Hume, the stricter empiricist, cares nothing for characterless things.

Related Ideas

Idea 12509 If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke]

Idea 12512 If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke]


The 11 ideas from 'Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix'

Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume]
Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume]
If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume]
Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume]
A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume]
Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume]
Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume]
We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume]
Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume]
Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume]
We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume]