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Single Idea 21314

[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity ]

Full Idea

One would think it really self-evident that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity, any more than knowledge can presuppose truth, which it presupposes.

Gist of Idea

Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it

Source

Joseph Butler (Analogy of Religion [1736], App.1)

Book Ref

'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Perry,John [University of California 1975], p.100


A Reaction

It rather begs the question to dogmatically assert that mere consciousness presupposes a self, especially after Hume's criticisms. That consciousness implies a subject to experience needs arguing for. Is it the best explanation?


The 7 ideas from Joseph Butler

A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler]
Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler]
Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler]
If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler]
If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler]
Butler exalts conscience, but it may be horribly misleading [Anscombe on Butler]
Everything is what it is, and not another thing [Butler]