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Single Idea 21323
[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
]
Full Idea
A man challenges a thief in possession of his horse only on similarity. The testimony of witnesses to the identity of a person is commonly grounded on no other evidence. ...Evidence of our own identity is grounded in memory, and gives undoubted certainty.
Gist of Idea
The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case
Source
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 4)
Book Ref
'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Perry,John [University of California 1975], p.111
A Reaction
With other people the best we can hope for is type-identity, hoping that each individual being is a unique type, but with otherselves we are always confident of establishing token identity. Could I have been someone different yesterday, without realising?
The
16 ideas
from 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory'
23644
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Without memory we could have no concept of duration
[Reid]
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23643
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We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings)
[Reid]
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1356
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A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees
[Reid]
|
1359
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Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility
[Reid]
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21319
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I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent
[Reid]
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21323
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The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case
[Reid]
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21321
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Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses
[Reid]
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1350
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Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist
[Reid]
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21322
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We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language
[Reid]
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21320
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Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define
[Reid]
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1352
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Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't
[Reid]
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1367
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Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence
[Reid]
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21325
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Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten!
[Reid]
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21324
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If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20
[Reid]
|
21327
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If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude
[Reid]
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1366
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If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing
[Reid]
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