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Single Idea 21327
[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
]
Full Idea
When a stolen horse is claimed, the only evidence that this is the same horse is similitude. But would it not be ridiculous from this to infer that the identity of a horse consists in similitude only?
Gist of Idea
If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude
Source
Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 6)
Book Ref
'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Perry,John [University of California 1975], p.116
A Reaction
Actually that is exactly Hume's view of the matter (Idea 21292). For a strict empiricist there is nothing else be close resemblance over time. I prefer Reid's account to Hume's. - but then I am not a 'strict' empiricist.
Related Idea
Idea 21326
Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke]
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[criticisms the Self as continuity of consciousness]:
6139
|
Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance
[Merricks on Locke]
|
5513
|
Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough
[Kant on Locke]
|
1345
|
Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope
[Butler on Locke]
|
1197
|
No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings
[Locke]
|
1364
|
Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself
[Reid on Locke]
|
12511
|
If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing?
[Locke]
|
1361
|
If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts?
[Reid on Locke]
|
21326
|
Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it
[Reid on Locke]
|
1387
|
Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance
[Perry on Locke]
|
21314
|
Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it
[Butler]
|
21312
|
Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered
[Hume]
|
21321
|
Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses
[Reid]
|
21325
|
Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten!
[Reid]
|
21324
|
If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20
[Reid]
|
21327
|
If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude
[Reid]
|
1366
|
If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing
[Reid]
|
21452
|
I can only determine my existence in time via external things
[Kant]
|
5582
|
As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity
[Kant]
|
5327
|
Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories
[Ayer]
|
1396
|
We identify persons before identifying conscious states
[Carruthers]
|