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Single Idea 21327

[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity ]

Full Idea

When a stolen horse is claimed, the only evidence that this is the same horse is similitude. But would it not be ridiculous from this to infer that the identity of a horse consists in similitude only?

Gist of Idea

If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude

Source

Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 6)

Book Ref

'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Perry,John [University of California 1975], p.116

A Reaction

Actually that is exactly Hume's view of the matter (Idea 21292). For a strict empiricist there is nothing else be close resemblance over time. I prefer Reid's account to Hume's. - but then I am not a 'strict' empiricist.

Related Idea

Idea 21326 Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke]

The 16 ideas from 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory'

23644 Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid]
23643 We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid]
1356 A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid]
1359 Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid]
21319 I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid]
21323 The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid]
21321 Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid]
1350 Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid]
21322 We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid]
21320 Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid]
1352 Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid]
1367 Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid]
21324 If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid]
21325 Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid]
21327 If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]
1366 If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]