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Single Idea 21338

[filed under theme 19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique ]

Full Idea

I am not concerned even to avoid the trivial extreme of sustaining a law by changing a meaning; for the cleavage between meaning and fact is part of what ...I am questioning.

Gist of Idea

I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage

Source

Willard Quine (Letters [1962], 1962.06.01)


A Reaction

[Letter to Adolf Grünbaum. Found on Twitter] A strikingly helpful expression of his position by Quine. We should take about the 'meaning/fact distinction' in order to understand clearly what is going on here.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [rejection of sharp distinction between real and verbal assertion]:

Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject [Schleiermacher]
When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege]
Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences [Quine]
In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]
I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage [Quine]
Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine]
If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical? [Rey]
The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K]
Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider]