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Single Idea 21342
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
]
Full Idea
Moore characterises internal relations modally, as those essential to their relata. If a and b are related R-wise, and R is an internal relation, a and b could not fail to be so related; otherwise R is external.
Gist of Idea
A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related
Source
report of G.E. Moore (External and Internal Relations [1919]) by John Heil - Relations 'Internal'
Book Ref
'Routledge Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin/Simons etc [Routledge 2012], p.313
A Reaction
I don't think of Moore as an essentialist, but this fits the essentialist picture nicely, and is probably best paraphrased in terms of powers. Integers are the standard example of internal relations.
The
23 ideas
from G.E. Moore
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21342
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A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related
[Moore,GE, by Heil]
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17992
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The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe.
[Moore,GE]
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7527
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Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language
[Moore,GE, by Monk]
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6405
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Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism
[Moore,GE, by Grayling]
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22302
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Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts
[Moore,GE, by Potter]
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7526
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Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down
[Moore,GE, by Monk]
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22151
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The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction
[Boulter on Moore,GE]
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8033
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Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action
[MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
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8032
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Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch?
[MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
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11050
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Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent
[Hanna on Moore,GE]
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23726
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Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism
[Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
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5925
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The three main values are good, right and beauty
[Moore,GE, by Ross]
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8039
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Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is
[MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
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5902
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For Moore, 'right' is what produces good
[Moore,GE, by Ross]
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5907
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Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them
[Ross on Moore,GE]
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11057
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It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good
[Moore,GE]
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11056
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The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good'
[Moore,GE]
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5903
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'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means
[Moore,GE]
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18676
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We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation
[Moore,GE]
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21233
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The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire
[Moore,GE]
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6349
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I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand'
[Moore,GE]
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20147
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Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger
[Moore,GE]
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6672
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Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false'
[Moore,GE, by Lowe]
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