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Single Idea 21350

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence ]

Full Idea

On the conception that properties are powers, it is no longer obvious that causal relations are external relations. Given the powers - all the powers in play - you have the manifestations.

Gist of Idea

If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations

Source

John Heil (Relations [2009], 'Causal')

Book Ref

'Routledge Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Le Poidevin/Simons etc [Routledge 2012], p.317


A Reaction

This also delivers on a plate the necessity felt to be in causal relations, because the relation is inevitable once you are given the relata. But can you have an accidental (rather than essential) internal relation? Not in the case of numbers.

Related Idea

Idea 21348 In the case of 5 and 6, their relational truthmaker is just the numbers [Heil]


The 24 ideas with the same theme [powers as giving the essential nature of each thing]:

The hidden harmony is stronger than the visible [Heraclitus]
Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle]
Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle]
The essence of a thing is its effort to persevere [Spinoza]
What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke]
The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz]
Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz]
My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz]
There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz]
Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber]
The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins]
The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau]
If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations [Heil]
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau]
Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]