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Single Idea 21367

[filed under theme 16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self ]

Full Idea

My body is the only object of which I know not merely the one side, that of the representation, but also the other, that is called 'will'.

Gist of Idea

I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will

Source

Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I 125), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 3 'Will'

Book Ref

Janaway,Christopher: 'Schopenhauer' [OUP 2002], p.40


A Reaction

I'm not convinced that knowledge of the body through the will (and action, presumably) constitutes a different sort of knowledge. Philosophers are always trying to split the world in two (but not Nietzsche!).


The 29 ideas with the same theme [directly acquiring knowledge of our Selves]:

We have an apparent and a true self; only the second one exists, and we must seek to know it [Anon (Upan)]
Successful introspection reveals the substrate along with the object of thought [Porphyry]
Self-knowledge needs perception of the affections of the body [Spinoza]
We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz]
Self-knowledge can only be inner sensation, and thus appearance [Kant]
We gain self-knowledge through action, not thought - especially when doing our duty [Goethe]
What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer]
I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will [Schopenhauer]
'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce]
Things are the boundaries of humanity, so all things must be known, for self-knowledge [Nietzsche]
Our knowledge of the many drives that constitute us is hopelessly incomplete [Nietzsche]
Just as skin hides the horrors of the body, vanity conceals the passions of the soul [Nietzsche]
Great self-examination is to become conscious of oneself not as an individual, but as mankind [Nietzsche]
We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl]
There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger]
How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre]
Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre]
My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre]
Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer]
We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman]
Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge]
Outer senses are as important as introspection in the acquisition of self-knowledge [Cassam]
Is there a mode of self-awareness that isn't perception, and could it give self-knowledge? [Cassam]
Neither self-consciousness nor self-reference require self-knowledge [Cassam]
The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action [Zagzebski]
Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever]
Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever]
We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever]
The self is embodied, perspectival, volitional, narrative and social [Seth, by PG]