more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 21409
[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
]
Full Idea
No moral principle is based on any feeling whatsoever.
Gist of Idea
Moral principles do not involve feelings
Source
Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 376 Pref)
Book Ref
Kant,Immanuel: 'The Metaphysics of Morals', ed/tr. Gregor,Mary [CUP 1991], p.182
The
30 ideas
with the same theme
[morality is just an expression of feelings]:
2360
|
'Good' is just what we desire, and 'Evil' what we hate
[Hobbes]
|
6234
|
If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings
[Shaftesbury]
|
22382
|
We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings
[Hume]
|
21409
|
Moral principles do not involve feelings
[Kant]
|
6196
|
People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous
[Kant]
|
20237
|
Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions
[Nietzsche]
|
20238
|
Treating morality as feelings is just obeying your ancestors
[Nietzsche]
|
21741
|
'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval
[Russell]
|
23689
|
Moral words have an inherited power from expressing attitudes in emotional situations
[Stevenson,CL]
|
6969
|
Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them
[Ayer]
|
6970
|
Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern
[Ayer]
|
23725
|
Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism
[Ayer, by Smith,M]
|
5206
|
To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval
[Ayer]
|
22486
|
The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings
[Foot]
|
22477
|
Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings
[Foot]
|
2706
|
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons
[Hare]
|
24007
|
Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions
[Williams,B]
|
8035
|
In trying to explain the type of approval involved, emotivists are either silent, or viciously circular
[MacIntyre]
|
8037
|
The expression of feeling in a sentence is in its use, not in its meaning
[MacIntyre]
|
8040
|
Emotivism cannot explain the logical terms in moral discourse ('therefore', 'if..then')
[MacIntyre]
|
8042
|
Nowadays most people are emotivists, and it is embodied in our culture
[MacIntyre]
|
23727
|
Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence
[Smith,M]
|
2853
|
Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes
[Brink]
|
2852
|
Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless
[Brink]
|
2849
|
Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference
[Brink]
|
2851
|
Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements
[Brink]
|
2850
|
How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it?
[Brink]
|
2848
|
Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement
[Brink]
|
7333
|
The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval
[Miller,A]
|
4375
|
Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation
[Achtenberg]
|