more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 21455

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity ]

Full Idea

In nature the understanding cognizes only what exists, or has been, or will be. It is impossible that something ought to be other that what it in fact is. ...We cannot ask what ought to happen in nature, any more than what properties a circle should have.

Gist of Idea

We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature

Source

Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B575/A547)

Book Ref

Kant,Immanuel: 'Critique of Pure Reason', ed/tr. Guyer,P /Wood,A W [CUO 1998], p.540


A Reaction

This seems to be the first clear recognition of what we now call 'normativity', which seems like a misfit in naturalistic views. Davidson derives a sort of mental dualism from it. Note that powers and dispositions can also not be directly cognised.

Related Idea

Idea 21457 Reason has two separate objects, morality and freedom, and nature, which ultimately unite [Kant]


The 8 ideas with the same theme [what ought to be true as an aspect of nature]:

We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature [Kant]
Minds essentially and always strive towards value [Weil]
If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan]
Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil]
Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]