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Full Idea
The realism about possibilities, generalities, tendencies and habits that we find in Peirce's later maxim is something that the logical positivists would have been uncomfortable with.
Gist of Idea
Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism
Source
report of Charles Sanders Peirce (works [1892]) by Albert Atkin - Peirce 2 'Concl'
Book Ref
Atkin,Albert: 'Peirce' [Routledge 2016], p.69
A Reaction
Atkin examines the various later statements of the earlier maxim, given here in Idea 21490. Ryle and Quine express the empiricist and logical positivist approach to dispositions.
Related Ideas
Idea 14297 A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle]
Idea 16945 We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
21489 | Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin] |
19095 | Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak] |
19097 | Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak] |
21494 | If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce] |
19102 | Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak] |
10352 | The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce] |
21491 | Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin] |
16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
13498 | Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD] |
19107 | Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce] |
21493 | Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce] |