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Single Idea 21496

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique ]

Full Idea

Far from guaranteeing a high likelihood of truth by itself, testimonial agreement can apparently do so only if the circumstances are favourable as regards independence, prior probability, and individual credibility.

Gist of Idea

Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely

Source

Erik J. Olsson (Against Coherence [2005], 1)

Book Ref

Olsson,Erik J.: 'Against Coherence' [OUP 2008], p.2


A Reaction

This is Olson's main thesis. His targets are C.I.Lewis and Bonjour, who hoped that a mere consensus of evidence would increase verisimilitude. I don't see a problem for coherence in general, since his favourable circumstances are part of it.


The 6 ideas from 'Against Coherence'

Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson]
Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]
Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson]