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Single Idea 21497

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique ]

Full Idea

Without a detailed account, coherence is reduced to the mere muttering of the word 'coherence', which can be interpreted so as to cover all arguments, but only by making its meaning so wide as to rob it of almost all significance.

Gist of Idea

If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments

Source

A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.246), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 2.2

Book Ref

Olsson,Erik J.: 'Against Coherence' [OUP 2008], p.13

A Reaction

I'm a fan of coherence, but it is a placeholder, involving no intrinsic or detailed theory. I just think it points to the reality of how we make judgements, especially practical ones. We can categorise the inputs, and explain the required virtues.

Related Idea

Idea 21513 We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]

The 23 ideas with the same theme [criticisms of the coherentist view]:

23206 Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme [Nietzsche]
21497 If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
6873 Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman]
8879 Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa]
8813 If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock]
8891 My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour]
8892 Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour]
8894 Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour]
3590 Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M]
3589 Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M]
2732 Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R]
2733 It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R]
2734 A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R]
6354 Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz]
6367 Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz]
10340 Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch]
10345 Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch]
7297 My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
21496 Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson]
21499 Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson]
21502 A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson]
21512 Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson]
19721 Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag]