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Single Idea 21500

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory ]

Full Idea

When the whole range of empirical beliefs is taken into account, all of them more or less dependent on memorial knowledge, we find that those which are most credible can be assured by their mutual support, or 'congruence'.

Gist of Idea

We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another

Source

C.I. Lewis (An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation [1946], 334), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 3.1

Book Ref

Olsson,Erik J.: 'Against Coherence' [OUP 2008], p.35

A Reaction

Lewis may be over-confident about this, and is duly attacked by Olson, but it seems to me roughly correct. How do you assess whether some unusual element in your memory was a dream or a real experience?

The 15 ideas from C.I. Lewis

5828 Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI]
6556 If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI]
21500 We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI]
21498 Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI]
21501 If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI]
9357 Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
9358 There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
9362 Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI]
9361 We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI]
9363 Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]
9364 Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
9365 We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]
7803 Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle]
11002 Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read]
7791 The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle]